Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 37

Number 2

Article 9

Summer 1994

The Open-Minded Soldier and the University
Lee C. Bollinger
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Lee C. Bollinger, The Open-Minded Soldier and the University, 37 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad
Notes) - (1994).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol37/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

•

SOLDIER
54

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW S CHOOL

-

BY LEE

c. BOLLINGER

THIS ARTICLE IS ADAPTED FROM A
SPEECH FIRST DELIVERED AS THE
SECOND ANNUAL DAVIS, MARKERT,
NICKERSON LECTURE ON ACADEMIC
AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN
APRIL 1992. THE LECTURE, SPONSORED
BY THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
SENATE, RECOGNIZES THREE
INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE DEPRIVED
OF THEIR FACULTY POSITIONS DURING
THE MCCARTHY ERA BECAUSE OF
THEIR REFUSAL TO EXPLAIN
THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS TO A
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITIEE BENT
ON UNCOVERING SUBVERSIVE
AND SEDITIOUS ACTIVITIES. IT WAS
LATER PRINTED IN THE MICHIGAN
QUARTERLY REVIEW (WINTER 1993)
AND IS REPRINTED HERE
WITH PERMISSION.

TODAY OUR EARS ARE FILLED with cries
of alarm that we are about to be swept
away by a new flowing of the sea of
intolerance. Comparisons are even being
drawn to the McCarthy era. As the
problem has come to be characterized in
the last few years, the present phenomenon of intolerance is possessed of a
double irony. Where the McCarthy era
involved the right wing of the American
political spectrum victimizing the
university (among others), now it is said
to be the university itself, in the thralls of
the left, devouring its own members.
The charge is that a political orthodoxy has arisen about issues that are
reasonably debatable. There are, it is said,
prescribed views about various subjects,
but mostly about issues relating to certain
groups - blacks, women, gay and
lesbian individuals and so on. Indiscriminate charges of racism and sexism are
said to be everywhere. Mere ideas are
being equated with acts of discrimination. And an insistence on the dominance
of a single ideological perspective is
masquerading as protection of civil
rights, just as the McCarthyites with
willful blindness mistook political
opinion for subversion and revolutionary
action.
The new orthodoxy is supposedly
enforced, as before, through defamatory
accusations. In the McCarthy era, an
individual was labeled a "sympathizer" or
a "fellow traveler"; the person now is said
to be "racist" or "sexist." In recent years,
ideology is enforced also through official
sanctions under university speech codes,
ranging from coerced courses in "right"
thinking to expulsion from the university.
My view is that there is, indeed, a
serious problem of intolerance within the
American university today, but it is not as
simple as many believe . I do not think,
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TRUE BELIEF

however, that this is a problem, as many
claim, that is exclusively, or even primarily, of the left. I see many intolerant
people on the right and in the middle as
well, perhaps especially among those
who view themselves as preservers of the
status quo. People increasingly view it as
necessary and desirable to be committed
to certain positions, to the point where
discussion is virtually closed off or
infected by hostility. Viewpoints are too
quickly dismissed as nondiscussable. And
positions are deliberately taken with a
vehemence that augurs high costs for
those who would disagree.
At the same time, it is too easy simply
to criticize extreme examples of intolerance. There are many issues of great
importance to people within and without
the academic world being debated today.
I think many reasonable people within
the university are deeply confused or
conflicted about how to be an intellectual, or how to conceive of being an
intellectual, in such an environment.
Today, therefore, I am interested not
in legal rules related to the expression of
ideas, but in what legal thought can tell
us about some of the tensions that govern
our everyday lives. More than anything,
therefore, I want to try to understand the
internal and external pressures we feel, or
at least I feel, and, drawing particularly
on the theoretical literature of freedom of
speech, to offer some working assumptions about the human character that
help us understand both the basis for the
principle of academic freedom and why it
is continuously at risk of being undermined. I have divided my thoughts into
four parts, all leading up to what I hope
will explain my title, 'The Open-Minded
Soldier and the University."
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THE DANGERS OF BELIEF
To begin to understand the underlying
reasons and social function of academic
freedom, or of intellectual values, we
must situate our inquiry in a broader
theoretical context. We must begin with
the problem of belief. The basic theme is
this: The impulse to intolerance arises
out of the wish to believe, which is an
ever-present and powerful force in the
human psyche. Never far from the
surface in social interactions, it is a
continual threat to democratic societies
and to fundamental principles of human
decency.
Intolerance attacks at every point of
disagreement, insisting on conformity of
every outward actiorJ, including speech,
and frequently attempts to control the
inner world of the mind as well. It can
produce the most vicious behavior
human beings are capable of, the potential for which is detectable in its more
modest manifestations. And the impulse
to intolerance does not follow bad ideas
only; some of the worst cruelty in human
affairs has been committed in the pursuit
of morally perfect utopian visions leading to speculation that beliefs
sometimes only provide a protective
cover for other impulses, such as the
wish to dominate and destroy.
This wary vision of the human
personality is a profoundly important
theme in the traditions of this country
and of Western political and social
theory. The literature of freedom of
speech is steeped in it. The history of
censorship of speech, and of persecution
(or punishment) based on ideas held or
expressed, has produced some of the
most eloquent and insightful observations about the human desire to have
your way, to demand that others conform
to your way of thinking, and to rid the
world of those who would not. "Persecution for the expression of opinions is
perfectly logical," Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote in a famous judicial

passage, "[for] if you have no doubt of
your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart, you
naturally express your wishes in law and
sweep away all opposition. To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate
that you think the speech impotent ...
or that you do not care wholeheartedly
for the result, or that you doubt either
your power or your premises." 1
This potential "logic" of belief impels
people to very destructive ends. This is
the central theme of Socrates, John
Milton, John Stuart Mill, and great jurists
like Louis Brandeis and Learned Hand.
Indeed, the "logic" of belief ends ultimately in the annihilation of those who
disagree: "Pleasures are ultimates,"
Holmes said in one of his many letters to
Harold Laski, "and in cases of difference
between ourself and another there is
nothing to do except in unimportant
matters to think ill of him and in important ones to kill him." 2
"[O]n their premises," Holmes continued, "it seems to me logical in the
Catholic Church to kill heretics and [for]
the Puritans to whip Quakers - and I
see nothing more wrong in it from
ultimate standards than I do in killing
Germans when we are at war. When you
are thoroughly convinced that you are
right . .. I see nothing but municipal
regulations to interfere with your using
your power to accomplish it. The
sacredness of human life is a formula that
is good only inside a system of law."3
Writers of social and political theory
often also express the same fears about
the hegemonic tendencies of belief. Take,
as a recent example, a volume of essays
by the political theorist and philosopher
Isaiah Berlin, entitled The Crooked Timber
of Humanity. In his opening essay, "The
Pursuit of the Ideal", Berlin begins with
the observation that two forces, above all
others, have shaped human history in
this century, the first being advances in
scientific and technological knowledge

COMMITMENT

and the second the "great ideological
storms that have altered the lives of
virtually all mankind." 4 Berlin's theme is
the dangers of "ideology" or belief.
"Happy are those," he says at one
point, "who live under a discipline which
they accept without question, who freely
obey the orders of leaders, spiritual or
temporal, whose word is fully a,ccepted as
unbreakable law; or those who have, by
their own methods, arrived at clear and
unshakeable convictions about what to
do and what to be that brook no possible
doubt." But, though perhaps happy,
these people are also very dangerous:
The possibility of a final solution, writes
Berlin, - even if we forget the terrible
sense that these words acquired in
Hitler's day - turns out to be an illusion,
and a very dangerous one. "For if one
really believes that such a solution is
possible, then surely no cost would be
too high to obtain it: to make mankind
just and happy and creative and harmonious forever - what could be too high a
price to pay for that?"
Echoing Holmes's very language,
Berlin's mind follows the path of certitude about our beliefs to killing: "You
declare that a given policy will make you
happier, or freer, or give you room to
breathe; but I know that you are mistaken, I know what you need, what all
men need; and if there is resistance based
on ignorance or malevolence, then it
must be broken and hundreds of thousands may have to perish to make
millions happy for all time." 5 •
With this vision of such a dangerous
propensity in the human character to
intolerance, writers like Berlin and
Holmes prescribe a heavy dose of selfdoubt and uncertainty. They tend to
differ only in the degree to which they
would commit themselves, and others,
toward a posture of relativism in the
world. "Tolerance is the twin of incredulity," Learned Hand once said to
Holmes.6 And Holmes himself wrote in a
famous opinion that once we "have

realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths," we must "come to believe
even more than [we] believe the very
foundations of [our] own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . .. . " 7
Berlin writes that he accept the
position of "pluralism" after he read
Machiavelli and realized that "not all the
supreme values pursued by mankind
now and in the past were necessarily
compatible with one another." Thus the
Homeric Greeks may have been "cruel,
barbarous, mean, oppressive to the weak;
but they created the Iliad and the Odyssey, something we cannot do in our more
enlightened day." And what is true across
time and across cultures is also true
between individuals. "You believe in
always telling the truth, no matter what;"
wheras, "I do not, because I believe that
it can sometimes be too painful and too
destructive," he writes. So, "We can
discuss each other's point of view, we can
try to reach common ground, but in the
end what you pursue may not be reconcilable with the ends to which I find that
I have dedicated my life." 8
The essence of life, therefore, for
Holmes and Berlin and others like them,
is the "collision of values." We must learn
- in Berlin's words - that we "cannot
have everything, in principle as well as in
practice." 9 In this way Berlin concludes his
essay, and it would seem embarrassingly
simplistic were it not said against the
background of what he had said before and
what we know he had lived through.
11

MORALITY AND COMMITMENT
Ultimately, this perspective of Holmes,
Berlin and others does not satisfy, is
seriously incomplete, and therefore does
not account for the tensions of real life.
The critical problem with the recommendation of self-doubt, or of an acceptance

of multiple truths and pluralism, is that it
must end somewhere . As powerful as
their perspective is, it simply cannot
provide a full and complete guide to life.
At some point we will draw the line and
insist on having our way, insist that the
book is closed and the mind settled.
Of course, once that is pointed out,
everyone acknowledges it as if it were
obvious - even Holmes and Berlin.
Thus, Berlin, at the conclusion of his
essay says in the penultimate paragraph,
that certainly there are "if not universal
values, at any rate a minimum without
which societies could scarcely survive."
There can be no compromise, he acknowledges, when it comes to "slavery or
ritual murder or Nazi gas chambers or
torture . .. or mindless killing."10 There
is, in other words, an end to tolerance.
It is hardly surprising that our most
compelling warnings about the connections between belief and the darker
regions of the human personality come
from the pens of individuals who, in one
case (Mill), was raised from infancy
under the tutelage of an autocratic father
on a single intellectual and emotional diet
of Benthamite utilitarianism; who in
another (Holmes) fought and was
seriously wounded in the Civil War and
lived through the rabid intolerance of the
Red Scare; or who in still another (Berlin)
witnessed firsthand the barbarism
beneath the ideologies of fascism and
communism.
In the face of these firsthand encounters with the suffocating and cruel
tendencies of true belief, is it any wonder
that they would pursue self-doubt until
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 6 16, 130 (1919) ,
(Holmes,]. dissenting) .
2 Edmund Wilson, 'justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,''
in Patriotic Gore (New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1962), p. 762.
3 Ibid., p. 764.
4 Isaiah Berlin, "The Pursuit of the Ideal,'' in
The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Knopf,
1991), p. 1.
5 Ibid., pp. 13-14, 15.
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they even flirted with relativism? Because
ridding the society of virtually all de jure
their personal lives brushed up against
forms of racial discrimination, attention
one of the most destructive sides of the
has inevitably shifted to the next source
human personality, these individuals
of segregation and discrimination - that
seem possessed of a need to articulate a
which originates in the hearts and minds
vision of life that is more open-minded,
of people, not in legislative and official
more self-doubting, more willing to see
corridors. Today, and this has been true
the possibility of multiple truths in life,
now for many years, the problem of
than the visions of those who have never
racism in American society is primarily a
encountered the tyranny of the zealot and problem of attitude, of mind, not of
are eager to embark on the reformation of official policy. No rule makes white and
mankind.
Black students, in this university or any
But, whatever the reason for the partial other educational institution, eat at
vision of pluralists, the fact remains that
separate tables in dining halls, or sociallife is not only learning to be conscious of ize exclusively within each group. No
the potential destructiveness of belief; it
official policy makes a Black student or
is also learning and embracing - and
faculty member suffer a verbal insult at
being able to act on, which also means
night while walking across the campus.
insisting on - a basic code of morals and
And, as the civil rights movement
justice. And that, it turns out, is not a
achieved its successes and awakened the
simple or straightforward matter either.
conscience of the nation, other groups
To do the right thing, even when we
within the society have naturally been
· moved to press their "rights" too. For
clearly see it, often involves costs our
weaker wills will not bear, despite the
many people it has become clear, disscoldings of our nobler sentiments. To
turbingly clear, that we are partially if not
make matters worse, the right thing is,
largely socially created, so that the sense
unfortunately, often unclear in life, which of oneself within the society is the result
means not only that we experience a
of how other people see you. Thus, the
good deal of anxiety about what to do
status of women, Asian Americans,
but, more importantly, our weaker sides
Hispanic Americans and gay and lesbian
are provided with ready cover for
persons within the society has become a
choosing to do nothing.
major focus. While some of the problems
All this has acute relevance when you
these groups face still involve discriminalive in a time, as we do, in which (what
tory laws and official acts, for them, too,
Berlin called) the "minimum" is being
the most significant source of discriminarenegotiated. Many if not most of the
tion is that which comes from the mind.
matters about which intolerantNow, it would be naive to think that
mindedness is claimed today relate to
using social power - by which I mean
another great strand in our intellectual
all the myriad informal sanctions we
and cultural heritage, namely our great
impose on people every day: censuring,
project of equality and civil rights. This
denouncing, shunning, etc. - to shape
tremendous social effort to redefine
peoples' attitudes is not a legitimate part
relationships between groups within the
of this process of change. Social coercion
society involves using both legal and
only seems illegitimate when the effort is
social power to change both legal rules
made to refarm the way we think now; it
and social attitudes.
does not when used to enforce what we
Now, as the early civil rights movealready believe firmly to be wrong. No
ment, spurred on by the Supreme Court's one today, presumably, would think it
decision in Brown v. Board of Education
illegitimate to condemn someone who
(1954), successfully completed its goal of refused to associate with another person
58
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just because of the color of that person's
skin. We would express disgust, collectively if we could, and employ what
social powers we possessed to make him
reform his conduct and his attitude.
But, of course, it was not always this
way. If we had lived in, say, the 1930s or
'40s, our objection to this behavior and
the attitude it reflects would probably
have been only that it was impolite or
imprudently inflammatory, not morally
repugnant. "Reasonable" people then
believed that they had a "right" not to
associate with black people, just like
"reasonable" people in the 1950s were
convinced that it was appropriate to fire
people because they thought the precepts
of communism or socialism superior to
those of capitalism. We now feel very
differently. Our attitudes toward those
attitudes have changed. That happened
in part through reason, but it also
happened, and continues to happen
today, through the exercise of social
coercion. People who continue to think
that way are made to feel the consequences of private sanctions, of being
personally "disliked," or "unwelcome."
That is how it should be. That is how
the moral conscience has been created
and recreated over time. And now the
same process continues. We are in the
midst of a great social Reformation,
which, in my view, is generally all to the
good. It is an appropriate and desirable
step in following the aspirations of our
social and political principles.
The great Reformation of mind and
attitude we are in the middle of, like any
Reformation, is filled with confusion
about how we want to reform ourselves
and others. As in any revolution, there is
uncertainty about what of the past regime
to jettison as tainted and what to preserve
and carry forward. And there is confusion and uncertainty about how exactly
to revise the incredibly intricate interactions of our daily lives. For example,
where to draw the lines between treating
women as sexual objects and being latter-

day Puritans is, unfortunately, not always
self-evident.
Here's the main point: Belief and its
tendencies are a great concern of our
culture and give rise to the felt need to
inculcate self-doubt and self-restraint.
But there is also a minimum, a floor of
principles to which we legitimately will
demand adherence. And inside the
process of defining these basic principles
of morality and justice, which is ongoing
and changing, the call is for belief and
commitment. There our fear is of apathy
and timidity, of not having the courage of
our convictions, or even the courage to
have convictions, of being the "reasonable" people who in the past accepted as
normal what we now regard as immoral
and unjust.
We live with this abiding tension of
needing to be more self-doubting and at
the same time becoming even more
committed to our basic principles.
111

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
INTELLECTUAL VALUES
In this complex world, there is, I
believe, a special role for the university.
It is a role that focuses more on the
correction of the impulse to intolerance
than on the need for commitment to
belief. All institutions, all professions,
indeed all individuals, have ideal images
toward which they orient their behavior.
For me, the image of the university
involves a profoundly important process
of suspension of belief, which produces
an open mind and a sympathetic imagination that bravely explores the paths of
human thought and experience, as well
as nature, without reserve. This process is
not standardless; it is guided by notions
of reason and truth. But it is continuously
self-reflective, even about what we take
to be "reason" and "truth."
Intellectuals, artists, scientists, are
watchers - always looking for what
seems to make no sense, for what's
surprising, for what's foreign, for what's

hidden. And so the healthy academic
community has its own special sounds,
the sounds of sentences like these: But is
that true? Maybe there's something to
that. Let me think about it. I wonder.
That's interesting. I've changed my mind.
The university strives to be this way
not because it is the only way to improve
our understanding of the world. The life
of action, of commitment to belief, with
all its sharp conflict, too has its own way
of giving off the sparks of truth. But the
approach of intellectual freedom is one
distinctive method, and in a world so
largely organized around the other
approach, the special character of the
university is all the more useful to
preserve, as wilderness is so much more
precious in an urbanized life.
Additionally, the si;iecial world of
intellectual and artistic freedom in the
university also stands as a fixed warning
for the rest of society that the commitment to belief has its excesses and must
be moderated with self-doubt. In this, I
believe, academic freedom shares the
same function as the principle of freedom
of speech - a special preserve of openness in a society forever on the verge of
entering the destructive territory that
concerns Holmes and Berlin.
So, in these two great pulls of life, the
impulse to intolerance and the need for
commitment to belief, the university and
its principle of academic freedom opts to .
overcome the former, because it lives
primarily in a world of the latter. No
claim should be made that it is an ideal
toward which all human activity should
aim, nor that it is the only way - or
perhaps even the best way if one had to
choose among several - to achieve its
goals (i.e., truth, understanding). It is,
rather, an extreme extension of a single
strand of the human character, justified
in being extreme by its location in a
human universe that tends toward
extremes in other directions. The defining characteristic of the university,
therefore, ought to be the extraordinary
degree to which it is open to ideas.

IV
THE VULNERABILITY OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
But there are many reasons why this
ideal of intellectual freedom is so vulnerable in the real world. The contemporary
university is inextricably entwined in the
political and moral issues of the day. That
is partly because social change often
begins with society's youth, and it is at
the university that youth tend first to
become politically active and to seek
social change.
It is also partly due to the actions of
the university itself. Driven by financial
needs to seek the assistance of outside
individuals and institutions, the university must deal with donors who insist on
supporting only research or programs
with a high degree of "relevance." There
is the risk that deans and administrators
within the university will themselves tend
to internalize this value, which gradually
undermines the ideal of open and
unconstrained intellectual inquiry.
Finally, the university is itself an actor,
not only a body of individuals pursuing
ideas in the abstract. The university
decides which faculty to hire and which
courses to require and offer.
But there is something even more
profound, I believe, than any of these
pressures that continually threatens to
erode the ideal of academic freedom. It
stems from a dilemma deep in the psyche
of the enterprise. To put the matter sharply,
intellectuals are good at thinking through a
problem, but never to lead, and probably
not even to join, the platoon.
6 Gerald Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins
of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History," 27 Stan. L Rev. 757
(1975).
7 Gerald Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins
of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History," 27 Stan. L Rev. 757
(1975) .
8 Berlin, supra note 12 , pp. 5-6, 8.
9 Ibid., p . 17.
10 Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 17, 18.
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The suspension of belief, the openness
to ideas necessary to academic freedom, I
think, is achieved only through a process
that involves some mental distancing
from the real-world consequences of
choices, from pain and suffering, in the
way that a surgeon develops a numbness
to the knife. In addition, the capacity for
fixed commitment and decisive action
tends to atrophy with a developed
character of self-doubt and openmindedness. The capacities for dealing
with a less-than-perfect world, and a less
self-doubting world, are also diminished.
(The effective politician, for example,
must shed the potentiality for intellectual
embarrassment, which is absolutely
central to the identity of the true intellectual.)
Within the world of academic freedom
there will forever be discomfort with the
incapacities generated by the way of life
shaped by heightened awareness of
ignorance, self-doubt and openmindedness. Along with discomfort,
there will be efforts to deny that truth
about our condition and to prove that we
are capable of commitment to beliefs.
Like many people of genius, Holmes
expressed these tensions powerfully
because he suffered from them so
acutely. He almost lusted after self-doubt,
because he was repelled by the behavior of
true believers (among whom, significantly,
he counted himself when he served as a
soldier in the Civil War). He "detested," he
said, the person who "knows that he
knows" and who "catches postulates like
the influenza," 11 yet he also felt some deep
admiration for those who saw clearly a
truth and pursued it even to the point of
sacrificing their own lives.
Sometimes, Holmes seemed to face up
to the potentially enervating consequences that self-doubt has for commitment to action. On one occasion, in a
letter, he·forged an ideal of what he
hoped he could be - what I call the
open-minded soldier: "[T]ake thy place
on the one side or the other," he recom60
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mended, "if with the added grace of
knowing that the Enemy is as good .. . as
thou, so much the better, but kill him if
thou Canst. "12 Given what we know
about how the mind works in war, whose
participants more than at any other time
must summon the will (or the courage)
to act, the image of combining this action
with an intellectual character of selfdoubt and sympathetic imagination has
always seemed to me vivid and powerful
(though, I should add, its drift toward
relativism does not). Its seeming improbability reveals its central and profound
message.
But whether one should take this as a
viable ideal toward which all should
strive or (following what I believe are the
implications of Berlin's argument, which
he does not pursue)~s a hopeless
attachment to incompatible ways of life, I
remain ambivalent. I am inclined toward
the latter, the less sunny, view. To act is
to darken the periphery of our vision. To
regain the periphery, we sacrifice the
single-mindedness that is the spring of
the will to act. And, if that is true, then to
try to have both states is to have neither
as well as we might, producing perhaps a
kind of oscillation between mediocre
states of both.
That is not to say, however, that the
will and capacity to act effectively is
entirely destroyed in the intellectual
world; only that it is diminished. And, as
I mentioned a moment ago, the university must act. It has an intellectual center,
in which the principle of academic
freedom reigns, but it also has a workplace, residences and a system of faculty
and course selection created by choice.
And whenever it does act, I believe the
university most follows and reinforces its
special social identity by aspiring to be
Holmes's open-minded soldier.
This leads me to close with an illustration of what I have in mind and a
paradox for the university and the
principle of academic freedom. The
dilemma is this: Among the actions we
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are periodically called upon to take is
that of deciding whether to maintain the
principle of academic freedom itself or to
modify or abandon it altogether. Yet, if it
is true that the practice of academic
freedom diminishes the capacity to act,
then the principle is especially vulnerable
to attacks from without, as well as from
psychological tensions from within (for
reasons I have already suggested); or its
defense will be taken over by those more
accustomed to action but whose defense
paradoxically will violate the very spirit
of the enterprise.
I see this happening all the time with
freedom of speech. Challenges to the
prevailing rule that extremist or highly
offensive speech is protected are growing.
It is being pointed out that the harm of
these speech acts is greater than generally
acknowledged, that further exceptions to
the First Amendment can safely be
created, and that the specter of
McCarthyism is now more behind us
than we think. These arguments, though
I disagree with them, are perfectly
reasonable and debatable positions.
However, such challenges are frequently
met with a closed-mindedness, a pigheadedness, that makes me wince.
We must understand that the soul of
academic freedom, just like the soul of
freedom of speech, resides not in particular rules or outcomes but in a spirit with
which we approach life. It is a spirit that
is born of a wariness of the dangers of
belief, but that recognizes the importance
of belief and commitment too. It is a
spirit that while stretching in one direction, for perfectly good social reasons,
lives comfortably with the disabling
consequences of that course. Above all
else, it seeks a capacity of understanding
of the world, and of the consequences of
our actions in it, that tries to come as
close as we can to Holmes's open-minded
soldier.

mm
11 Wilson, supra note 10, p. 777.
12 Gunther, supra note 14, p. 757.

